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CASE NOTES

In statutory construction problems the courts should "[rule] out literalism as an absolute and an end in and of itself. . .. "0 Nevertheless, unless a literal reading of a statute would lead to absurd consequences, 7' a
careful adherence to statutory language is preferable. It is incumbent upon
the legislature to phrase statutes in a manner that clearly reflects the
objective to be accomplished. When a statute is part of a code, an even
greater obligation is imposed upon the legislature to insure that the code
provisions will provide a workable, coherent scheme. If the legislature falls
short of this duty, the courts are left with the difficult task of extracting
reasonable interpretations. As evidenced by the Ward decision, this can
result in further confusion and uncertainty.
Betty L. Newcomb Hollowell
USURY-Penalties-Recovery of Usurious Interest Paid Is Not
Authorized As a Forfeiture Under Article 5069-1.06(1)
FirstState Bank v. Miller,
563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978).
O.W. Miller and his wife, Macile Miller, contracted with the First State
Bank of Bedford (Bank) for a $70,000 note payable in three years with
interest at the rate of ten percent per annum. Pursuant to this contract,
the Millers had the use of only $56,000. The remaining $14,000 was frozen
in a non-interest bearing account to guarantee two postdated checks for
the first two years' interest. After the death of her husband, Mrs. Miller
repaid the contracted principal of $70,000 and brought suit alleging usury
and seeking double the usurious interest contracted for and charged. The
trial court, after holding that the loan was not usurious, rendered judgment
in favor of the Bank. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered in
part, holding inter alia that the $56,000 was the true principal, and that
the $14,000 was, in fact, usurious interest and should be returned to Mrs.
Miller to satisfy the purpose of the usury statute.' The Bank appealed to
the Texas Supreme Court. Held-Affirmed as modified. The recovery of
usurious interest paid is not authorized as a forfeiture penalty under article
70. Hattaway v. United States, 304 F.2d 5, 9 (5th Cir. 1962).
71. Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 (1926)).

1. Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 97, 102-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977), aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978). The court held that since the $21,000
in interest contracted for was usurious based on the true principal of $56,000, Mrs. Miller was
entitled to recover double the interest contracted for or charged in the amount of $42,000,
and that the two $7,000 amounts the bank failed to recover in its counterclaim should be
awarded to the plaintiff. Id. at 103.
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5069-1.06(1) of the Texas Civil Statutes.2
Although now defined by constitutional and statutory provisions and
judicial precedents, the concept of usury dates back to'the Old Testament.'
Until the Reformation, the collection of any interest whatsoever for the
lending of money was considered a sin, as well as a breach of the law.,
During this period the charging of interest in a moderate amount was first
allowed, and it was not until the Statute of Anne that interest rates were
statutorily regulated. 5 In the United States two general approaches eventually developed with regard to the enforcement of usury statutes and the
treatment of usurious contracts: the pari delicto approach and the victim
approach.' In a number of jurisdictions both the lender and the borrower
to a usurious contract were apparently regarded as in pari delicto based
on the general rule that money voluntarily paid with knowledge of all facts
cannot be recovered although the contract or claim was illegal.' Consequently, these courts left the parties to the usurious contract as they found
them and disallowed any recovery of usurious interest paid by the borrower.' In those jurisdictions appearing to follow the victim approach, the
lender was regarded as an oppressor and the borrower as a victim.' Since
the lender was regarded to have taken advantage of the unwary and the
2. First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. 1978). Article 5069-1.06(1)
provides that "[any person who contracts for, charges or receives" usurious interest "shall
forfeit to the obligor twice the amount of interest contracted for, charged or received .... "
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971). The court also held that since Mrs.
Miller had not pled for recovery of any interest either at trial court or in the court of civil
appeals, she could not sustain a favorable judgment for the $14,000. First State Bank v.
Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. 1978); accord, Oil Field Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 381 S.W.2d 183, 191 (Tex. 1964); Carreon v. Texas State Dep't. of Pub. Welfare,
537 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
3. See Pearce and Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A Study of the
Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 233 (1968). See generally Leviticus 25:36; Deuteronomy
23:19; Psalms 15.
4. See Pearce and Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A Study of the
Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 233-34 (1968).
5. See Pearce and Williams, Punitive Past to Current Conveniece-A Study of the Texas
Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 234 (1968) (citing Statute of Anne, 1713, 12 Anne, c. 16).
6. Compare Alabama Cash Credit Corp. v. Bartlett, 144 So. 808, 808 (Ala. 1932) and
Wright v. First Nat'l Bank, 297 N.W. 505, 511 (Mich. 1941) (pari delicto approach) with
Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 167-68, 14 S.W. 227, 227-28 (1890) and
Temple Trust Co. v. Haney, 103 S.W.2d 1035, 1041 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), aff'd, 133 Tex.
414, 107 S.W.2d 368 (1937) (victim approach).
7. See, e.g., Gladwin State Bank v. Dow, 180 N.W. 601, 605 (Mich. 1920); Ferguson v.
Soden, 19 S.W. 727, 728 (Mo. 1892); Beach v. Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n, 76 P. 16, 18 (Or.
1904). See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 522 (1958).
8. See cases and material cited note 7 supra.
9. See Wheaton v. Hibbard, 20 Johns. 289, 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822); cf. Bexar Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 167-68, 14 S.W. 227, 228 (1890) (paridelicto approach
rejected). See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 522 (1958).
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less fortunate borrower, such borrower was allowed to recover interest paid

on the usurious contract."l In enforcing usury laws Texas courts have declined to follow the pari delicto approach and have, instead, treated the
parties to a usurious contract under the victim approach."
Enforcement of usury laws in Texas dates back to the middle of the 19th
century when the regulation of interest rates was first incorporated in
Texas statutes.'" Shortly after the Civil War, however, the Reconstruction
government redrafted the Texas Constitution, repealing all usury laws.'
Seven years later, in the wake of severe credit abuses," the prohibition
against excessive interest was incorporated in the 1876 Constitution. 5 Article XVI, section 11 of the Texas Constitution, as amended November 8,
1960, authorized the legislature to define interest and establish maximum
rates of interest." Subsequently, the legislature defined interest as "the
compensation allowed by law for the use or forbearance or detention of
money"" and established a ten percent per annum maximum limit on
interest rates.'" Usury was defined as interest exceeding the amount fixed
by law,' 9 and it was stipulated that all written contracts, except those
otherwise authorized by law,'" which directly or indirectly provided for a
10. See cases and material cited note 9 supra.
11. See Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 167-68, 14 S.W. 227, 228
(1890); Temple Trust Co. v. Haney, 103 S.W.2d 1035, 1041 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), aff'd,
133 Tex. 414, 107 S.W.2d 368 (1937); Thompson v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 102 S.W.2d
285, 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1937, writ refd). See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 522
(1958).
12. See Pearce and Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A Study of the
Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 235 (1968). See generally TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11,
comment (Vernon 1955).
13. See TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 44 (1869). See generally TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11,
comment (Vernon 1955).
14. See generally TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11, comment (Vernon 1955).
15. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11 (1876).
16. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11.
17. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1971).
18. Id. art. 5069-1.04.
19. Id. art. 5069-1.01(d). The essential elements of usury are: (1) a loan or forbearance
of money, (2) an obligation of the borrower to repay the principal, and (3) an agreement to
pay more than the legal rate of interest for its use. See, e.g., Crow v. Home Say. Ass'n, 522
S.W.2d 457, 459-60 (Tex. 1975); Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 168, 14
S.W. 227, 228 (1890); Maloney v. Andrews, 483 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Loiseaux, Some Usury Problems in Commercial
Lending, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 419 (1971); Pearce and Williams, PunitivePast to Current Convenience-A Study of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233 (1968). The test for usury must
be applied to the net amount of money of which the borrower actually has use, which is not
necessarily the principal of the loan. Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 782 (Tex.
1977); Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 196, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937).
20. For example, certain regulated small loans may call for interest rates in excess of ten
percent. See TEX. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-3.15, .16 (Vernon 1971).
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greater interest rate would be subject to the appropriate penalties.2 , The
penalties were established in article 5069-1.06 and classified by the amount
of interest contracted for, charged, or received.2"
In Texas, under the victim approach, actions similar to that for money
had and received were at one time invoked to recover usurious interest
paid. 2' Payments of usurious interest made by the borrower were deemed
involuntary, and, therefore, the borrower and lender were not in paridelicto.24 With the enactment of statutes providing penalties for charging
or receiving usurious interest,25 the courts allowed the borrower to elect
between application of the usurious interest paid to the discharge of the
principal or recovery of twice the amount of the interest paid. 2 When it
was proven, however, that the borrower had knowingly paid usurious interest which was subsequently applied to the discharge of the principal,
the borrower was not permitted to recover either the usurious interest
paid in excess of the principal or the double interest penalty. 7 With these
precedents, the usury statutes were rewritten in 1967.8
The most significant change to the usury statutes in 1967 was the addition of the term "contracts for" to the former "charges or receives" in the
21. Id. art. 5069-1.04.
22. Id. art. 5069-1.06. Section (1) of article 5069-1.06 provides that a person contracting
for, charging, or receiving interest in excess of ten percent shall forfeit to the obligor twice
the amount contracted for, charged, or received. Section (2) mandates that a person charging
twenty percent or more "shall forfeit as an additional penalty, all principal as well as interest
and all other charges." Section (2) further stipulates that such person shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and establishes a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars. Section (3) provides
a four year statute of limitation. Id. art. 5069-1.06(1)-(3).
23. See Smith v. Stevens, 81 Tex. 461, 465, 16 S.W. 986, 989 (1891) (on rehearing); Bexar
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 168-69, 14 S.W. 227, 228 (1890).
24. See Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson,78 Tex. 163, 168, 14 S.W. 227, 228 (1890).
It was held that even a borrower who had voluntarily paid interest at an usurious rate could
recover the interest paid in excess of the rate permissible under the statute. Id. at 168, 14
S.W. at 228.
25. See 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § 1, at 277-78; 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 205, §
28, at 550.
26. Adleson v. B.F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 568, 80 S.W.2d 939, 941 (1935); Cherry
v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 876-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ); Ingram v.
Temple Trust Co., 108 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937), aff'd on other grounds
sub nor. Glenn v. Ingram, 133 Tex. 431, 126 S.W.2d 951 (1939). The courts recognized this
election to be valid only when the principal had not been repaid and they also held that the
remedies were mutually exclusive. Adleson v. B.F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex 564, 568, 80 S.W.2d
939, 941 (1935); Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 876-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974,
no writ); Ingram v. Temple Trust Co., 108 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Glenn v. Ingram, 133 Tex. 431, 126 S.W.2d 951 (1939).
27. Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 876-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no
writ); Ingram v. Temple Trust Co., 108 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937), aff'd
on other grounds sub nom. Glenn v. Ingram, 133 Tex. 431, 126 S.W.2d 951 (1939).
28. See 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, at 609-10 (codified at TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. arts. 5069-1.01 to 1.06 (Vernon 1971)).
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section prescribing penalties." In Wall v. East Texas Teachers Credit
Union " the Texas Supreme Court construed article 5069-1.06 to mean that
anyone who contracted for interest greater than ten percent would be required to forfeit twice the amount of interest whether or not interest was
paid.3" Furthermore, the court concluded that the penalty of twice the
amount of interest contracted for would not be realized if the borrower were
also required to pay the usurious interest." A subsequent case held that
to recover penalties for usurious interest any one of the three conditions
precedent would suffice: a contract for usurious interest, the charging of
usurious interest, or the receipt of usurious interest."
As a consequence of the penalty provisions, usury statutes have been
considered penal in nature. 4 As a general rule penal statutes have been
construed strictly, and this rule has been applied numerous times to require a strict construction of the usury statutes.35 The intention of the
legislature, however, has governed in the construction of both penal and
civil statutes, and penal statutes have not been construed so narrrowly as
to circumvent the clear intent of the legislature." Since the passage of the
29. Loiseaux, Some Usury Problems in Commercial Lending, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 419, 441
(1971); see TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
30. 533 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1976).
31. Id. at 921; see TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. Ann. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
32. Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976). In this
case the lender was affirmatively seeking payment of usurious interest which had not been
paid. The court of civil appeals had erroneously awarded the lender that payment as an offset
against the borrower's recovery of twice the contracted for interest. See id. at 921.
33. See Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. 1977).
34. E.g., First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978); Pinemont Bank
v. DuCroz, 528 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Temple Trust Co. v. Haney, 103 S.W.2d 1035, 1039 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), aff'd,
133 Tex. 414, 107 S.W.2d 368 (1937). See generally Comment, The JudicialAvoidance of
Liberal Statutory Contruction: Is Article 10, Section 8 Lost and Forgotten?, 10 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 163 (1978).
35. See, e.g., Commerce Trust Co. v. Best, 124 Tex. 583, 591, 80 S.W.2d 942, 946 (1935);
Pinemont Bank v. DuCroz, 528 S.W. 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Temple Trust Co. v. Haney, 103 S.W.2d 1035, 1039 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin), aff'd, 133 Tex. 414, 107 S.W.2d 368 (1937). See generally Pearce and Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A Study of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw.
L.J. 233 (1968).
36. See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974); United States v. Lacher,
134 U.S. 624, 629 (1890); accord, Thompson v. Missouri K. & T. Ry., 103 Tex. 372, 378-79,
126 S.W. 257, 259 (1910). The Texas Legislature has provided that in the construction of civil
statutes, the legislative intent is of paramount importance. TEX. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art.
10(6) (Vernon 1969); see Minton v. Frank, 545S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1976); State v. Shoppers
World, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1964). Further evidence of legislative disfavor with
the canon of strict construction can be found in section 1.05 of the Texas Penal Code which
states: "The rule that a Penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this code.
The provisions of this code shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms, to
promote justice and effect the objectives of the code." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.05(a)
(Vernon 1974).
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Texas Consumer Credit Code,37 of which the usury statutes are a part,
Texas courts have issued various constructions of the penal sections
3
therein. 8
In First State Bank v. Miller" the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether recovery of usurious interest paid was authorized as a forfeiture
penalty under article 5069-1.06(1).4" Although the court noted a procedural
error which alone precluded recovery of the usurious interest paid," it held
that such recovery was not authorized under the usury statute.2 The court
reasoned that it was not the intent of the legislature to provide for the
recovery of usurious interest paid, that the interpretation of Wall by the
court of civil appeals was erroneous, and that a strict construction of article
5069-1.06(1) limited recovery of usurious interest to a maximum of twice
that contracted for, charged, or received.43 Justice Daniel, writing for the
majority, reasoned that if the legislature had intended the additional penalty of forfeiture of interest actually paid under section (1) of article 50691.06, it could have been just as easily stated there as it was in section (2)
of the same article." In concluding its reasoning, the majority held that
article 5069-1.06(1), being penal in nature, should be strictly construed,
limiting recovery to the amount of usurious. interest contracted for,
charged, or received. 5
Justice Johnson, writing the dissenting opinion, interpreted the majority
37. TEx.

REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069 (Vernon 1971).
38. Compare Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Mannix, 557 S.W.2d 755, 769 (Tex. 1977) (on
motion for rehearing) and Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex.
1977) (penal provision within consumer credit code appears liberally construed) with First
State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978) and Crow v. Home Say. Ass'n, 522
S.W.2d 457, 460 (Tex. 1975) (usury provision within consumer credit code appears strictly
construed).
39. 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978).
40. Id.at 576.
41. Id. at 576. Mrs. Miller did not plead for recovery of any interest paid, no such claim
was tried by consent, and it was not presented on appeal. See Oil Field Haulers Ass'n, Inc.
v. Railroad Comm'n, 381 S.W.2d 183, 191 (Tex. 1964); Cape Conroe Ltd. v. Specht, 525
S.W.2d 215, 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
42. First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1978).
43. Id. at 577.
44. Id. at 576-77. Compare TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971)
(lender shall forfeit twice the amount of interest) with id. art. 5069-1.06(2) (lender "shall
forfeit as an additional penalty, all principal as well as interest"). Justice Daniel also wrote
that the correct determination of whether a borrower could recover interest paid on a usurious
contract was made in Ferguson v. Tanner Development Co. First State Bank v. Miller, 563
S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978). In Ferguson, a suit to recover statutory penalties, the court noted
that article 5069-1.06(1) does not specifically require the return of usurious interest received
by the lender as an additional penalty. Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex.
1977).
45. First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978).
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holding as authorizing a lender to retain usurious interest already collected
even though the borrower's payments were made "through ignorance, mistake, or fear. "" The dissent further found the court's holding to be contrary
to the legislative intent, the law of usury, and the equitable enforcement
of the statute as reflected in Wall. 7 Consequently, the dissenting justices
would have ordered the refund of usurious interest paid in addition to the
penalty of twice the contracted for interest."
By not requiring the refund of usurious interest paid, the majority opinion may frustrate the legislature's intent in enacting the usury statutes.
Lenders and borrowers are treated differently under the majority's interpretation based solely on whether the lender has exacted usurious interest.5 6 The lender who collects any or all usurious interest is penalized less
than the lender who has not received any payment of usurious interest.5
Although both lenders, as mandated by statute, are to "forfeit to the
46. Id. at 578 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 581 (Johnson, J., dissenting). See generally Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit
Union, 533 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1976). The dissent reasoned that the effect of the majority
holding was to adopt a pari delicto approach in construing usurious contracts by leaving the
parties where they were found, although such a construction would be contrary to legislative
intent and judicial precedent. First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tex. 1978)
(Johnson, J., dissenting); see Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 168, 14 S.W.
227, 228 (1890); Declarationof Legislative Intent, 15 TEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. 1, 1-2 (Vernon
1971). In First State Bank the dissent further argued that the majority's interpretation would
be inequitable, possibly even unconstitutional, because it would permit varying results from
case to case. Accordingly, the dissent would have applied another rule of construction that
would have avoided inequitable and unconstitutional results. First State Bank v. Miller, 563
S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J., dissenting); see McKinney v. Blankenship, 154
Tex. 632, 640-41, 282 S.W.2d 691, 697 (1955); Anderson v. Penix, 138 Tex. 596, 602, 161
S.W.2d 455, 458-59 (1942).
48. First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 581 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 578-79 (Johnson, J., dissenting); cf. Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit
Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976) (recovery against borrower of usurious interest before
maturity contrary to legislative purpose of usury statute).
50. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
51. The example below compares Lender A with Lender B. A and B both loan $10,000
at 15% for 2 years. A has been able to collect one year's interest of $1,500, while B has not.
Both A and B are sued for usury in a court that interprets article 5069.1.06(1) as requiring
penalties of twice the interest for which has been contracted. Assuming that A and B were
found guilty of usury, the enforcement of the penal provisions as interpreted by the majority
would have the following result.
Lender A
Interest Collected
Penalty: Twice the Interest Contracted for
($3,000 x 2)
NET PENALTY
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obligor twice the amount of interest," 2 the lender who has received payment of such interest is not specifically required to refund that amount."
As a result, the penalty of the lender who made collections is offset by the
usurious interest payments.54 Indeed, where a lender collects all of the
usurious interest contracted for, his net penalty would be nothing more
than the amount of such interest, thereby effectively eliminating the legislatively mandated penalty." Consequently, the majority's interpretation
in effect provides an incentive for lenders to apply whatever means possible
to collect interest from borrowers." Furthermore, it will be those individuals least likely to comprehend their rights under the usury statutes who
succumb to such pressures. 7 Since the stated purpose of enacting the
present usury statute was to protect "the uneducated, the unsophisticated,
the poor, and the elderly," the majority's interpretation is difficult to
reconcile with the intent of the legislature.
The legislature's declaration of intent evidences a recognition that the
penalties under the prior statute did not provide effective or workable
safeguards. 9 It is contrary to this stated intent to attribute to the legislature a desire to impose a penalty under article 5069-1.06(1) that would
52. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971).
53. See Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
54. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J., dissenting); cf. Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976) (obligor
required to pay usurious interest does not receive forfeiture of twice the contracted for interest).
55. Cf. Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976)
(obligor required to pay usurious interest does not receive forfeiture of twice the contracted
for interest). For example, if a borrower under a usurious contract agreed to pay $100,000 in
interest, the statutory penalty would be $200,000. If the lender had already collected the
$100,000 in usurious interest, his net penalty would be only $100,000, an amount equal only
to the contracted for interest. See First State Bank v. Miller 563 S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tex. 1978)
(Johnson, J., dissenting).
56. Cf. Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1976) (lender collecting should be in no better position than one merely contracting
for or charging), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
57. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
58. See Declaration of Legislative Intent, 15 TEx. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. 1, 1-2 (Vernon
1971). The Declaration of Legislative Intent states:
(1) Many citizens of our State are being victimized and abused in various types of
credit and cash transactions .

...

(4) These unregulated practices bring great social and economic hardship to many
citizens of our State. They impose intolerable burdens on those segments of our society
which can least afford to bear them-the uneducated, the unsophisticated, the poor
and the elderly.
Id. at 1-2.
59. See id. at 1-2.
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yield nothing more than the penalty of the prior statutc- t.'vice the interest
paid. 0 It would be more reasonable to construe section (1) as requiring the
refund of the interest paid, thereby making the penalty more of a safeguard.
Furthermore, the majority opinion is difficult to reconcile with the holding in Wall."' The court in Wall concluded that a penalty of twice the
amount of interest contracted for would not be realized if the borrower were
also required to pay the usurious interest. 2 The most significant difference
between First State Bank and Wall is that the lender in First State Bank
had collected usurious interest while the lender in Wall had not."3 It follows
from this comparison that the majority has restricted the application of
Wall to only those situations where the lender has yet to collect the usurious interest."4 The significance of this limitation is to provide different
penalties for the same usurious contract depending only upon whether the
lender has exacted usurious interest." The court, in essence, has created
60. See id. at 1-2. See generally Pearce and Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A Study of Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 249 (1968).
61. Compare First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 575-76 (Tex. 1978) (lender
allowed to retain usurious interest collected) with Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union,
533 S.W.2d 918, 920-21 (Tex. 1976) (lender not allowed to collect usurious interest).
62. Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976).
63. Compare First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 575-76 (Tex. 1978) (usurious
interest collected) with Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 920-21
(Tex. 1976) (no interest collected).
64. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 580 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 578-79 (Johnson, J., dissenting); cf. Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541
S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976) (lender collecting should be in
no better position than one merely contracting for or charging), rev'd on other grounds, 561
S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977). The following example compares Lender A and Borrower X with
Lender B and Borrower Y. Both groups contracted for a $10,000 note at 15% per annum for 2
years. Lender A never collected any interest. Under the authority of Wall his penalty is not
reduced by the amount of usurious interest. Lender B has collected all $3,000 of interest, and
under the authority of First State Bank B is not required to refund that amount.
Lender A

Lender B

Interest Collected
Penalty: Twice the Interest Contracted for

<

NET PENALTY

<$ 6,000>

<$ 3,000>

Borrower X

Borrower Y

Interest Paid
Relief: Twice the Interest Contracted for
NET RELIEF
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$-06,000>

$--0-

<

$ 3,000
6,000>

<$ 3,000>

6,000

6,000

$ 6,000

$ 3,000
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classifications in addition to those specified in the usury statute. The
legislature did not create classifications of lenders and borrowers according
to whether they had received or paid interest," and the propriety of creating such classifications by judicial fiat is questionable." It would have been
more consistent if Wall was applied by First State Bank so that article
5069-1.06(1) could be uniformly enforced within the legislatively created
classifications. 6
As a result of the holdings by the Texas Supreme Court in First State
Bank and Wall," when lower courts encounter a transaction where interest
has been contracted for, charged, and collected in various amounts, they
will find no guidance from the First State Bank opinion. 0 Following the
opinion literally, a court could properly award twice the amount of interest
contracted for or twice the amount of interest paid.7' Consequently, the
enforcement of the statute may become even more incongruous and inequitable as the courts draw their own conclusions."2 It is an established
principle of statutory construction that a statute "not be construed so as
66. See TEx.

REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
67. Cf. Railroad Comm'n v. Woods Exploration & Producing Co., 405 S.W.2d 313, 319
(Tex.) (court not empowered to enlarge powers granted to Commission), cert. denied, 385:
U.S. 991 (1966); Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 182, 354 S.W.2d 99,
109 (1961) (court may not invade legislative field); Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas
Corp., 155 Tex. 502, 528, 289 S.W.2d 559, 575 (1956) (duty of legislature to declare law and
of courts to apply it).
68. Cf. Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1976) (lender collecting should be in no better position than one merely contracting
for or charging), rev 'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977). For example, if the same
facts as in note 65 supra are assumed, except that the logic of Wall has been applied by the
court in which Lender B and Borrower Y appear, the net penalty and net relief for both groups
would equal $6,000. Consequently, article 5069-1.06(1) would be uniformly enforced within
the same classifications.
69. Compare First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 575-76 (Tex. 1978) (usurious
interest collected) with Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 920-21
(Tex. 1976) (no interest collected).
70. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 579 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
72. In the following example, X and Y are in different courts, both have borrowed $10,000
at 15% for 2 years, X has paid $1,500 interest, and Y has paid none. Further the court in which
X appeared only recognized interest paid, while Y's court recognized interest contracted for.

Borrower X
Interest Paid
Penalties Provided:
a. Twice the Interest Paid
b. Twice the Interest Contracted for
NET PENALTIES RECOVERED
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<$ 1,500>

Borrower Y
$-0-

3,000
6,000
$ 1,500

$ 6,000
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to ascribe to the legislature an intention to do an unjust or unreasonable
thing," if such statute is "reasonably susceptible" of a construction that
will avoid such a result.73 Accordingly, it would be more appropriate to
construe article 5069-1.06(1) as requiring the recovery of twice the amount
of interest contracted for in addition to a refund of interest paid.' Such a
construction would provide for the uniform application of penalties regardless of whether and to what extent usurious interest had actually been
5
7

paid. 1

If penalties, however, are not applied consistently, the result could be
the unconstitutional denial of equal protection." The equal protection
clauses of both the Texas and the United States Constitutions provide that
two persons under similar circumstances are to be treated alike both in
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.77 To determine the constitutionality of article 5069-1.06(1) under the equal protection provisions, the
proper test is whether a reasonable basis exists for statutory classifications
and whether the law operates equally towards all people within each
class. 8 Four classifications are established in the usury provisions; two
73. Anderson v. Penix, 138 Tex. 596, 602, 161 S.W.2d 455, 458-59 (1942); see
Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Mannix, 557 S.W.2d 755, 769 (Tex; 1977) (on motion for rehearing);
McKinney v. Blankenship, 154 Tex. 632, 640-41, 282 S.W.2d 691, 697 (1955).
74. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572,580 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J., dissent-

ing); cf Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976) (obligor
required to pay usurious interest does not receive forfeiture of twice the contracted for interest).
75. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
76. See id. at 578-79 (Johnson, J., dissenting); cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 44647 (1972) (dissimilar treatment of persons classified as married or unmarried); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971) (dissimilar treatment according to sex); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (arbitrary classification of corporations for purposes of
taxation).
77. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
75-77 (1971); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); see Rucker v. State, 170 Tex. Crim.
487, 488-89, 342 S.W.2d 325, 326-27 (1961); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; TEX. CONST. art I, § 3.
See generally TEX. CONST. art I, § 3, comment (Vernon 1955).
78. E.g., Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 49 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 14041 (1972); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966); see Railroad Comm'n v. Miller, 434
S.W.2d 670, 673 (Tex. 1968). At least three tests are applied at various times to determine
the constitutionality of laws under the equal protection provision. The rational basis test is
applied when administrative and statutory classifications are questioned as not being in
harmony with the purpose of the relevant administrative rule or statute. See Fuller v. Oregon,
417 U.S. 40, 49 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1972); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384
U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966). See generally L. TmBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991, 991-96
(1978). The "strict scrutiny" test is applied usually where classifications involve discrimination concerning race or national origin.-See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d
86, 90 (3d Cir. 1978). See generally J. NowA, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 522, 524-25 (1978). A third test similar to that of "strict scrutiny" has developed
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classifications are for those persons who loan money in excess of ten percent and twenty percent, and the other two classifications are for those
persons borrowing money in excess of ten pecent and twenty percent." The
classification of a person as a lender or as a borrower is reasonable as is
the further classification according to the magnitude of the violation. t
The imposition of penalties, however, as interpreted by the majority opinion, does not operate equally on all persons within each of the four classes;
rather, it depends solely on how much interest has actually been paid.'
Since there appears to be no rationale for varying the penalties within each
classification in such a manner, the statute as construed by the court in
First State Bank may be in conflict with both the United States and Texas
Constitutions.2 If the statute is susceptible to another construction that
would render the imposition of penalties constitutional, such a construction would be more appropriate." As evidenced by the dissent in First
in the past ten years and is most often applied to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy, See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 522, 525 (1978).
79. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 5069-1.06(1) & (2) (Vernon 1971).
80. See Watts v. Mann, 187 S.W.2d 917, 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref d).
See generally Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 49 (1974); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308.
09 (1966); Ground Water Conservation Dist. v. Hawley, 304 S.W.2d 764, 767-68 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 306 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1957).
81. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson,,J.,
dissenting); cf Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1976) (lender collecting should be in no better position than one merely contracting for or charging), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977). The example below
compares Lender A and Borrower X with Lender B and Borrower Y. Assume both groups
entered into a $10,000 loan at 15% for 2 years. Lender A has collected the first year's interest
of $1,500 from Borrower X; Lender B has collected no interest from Borrower Y. The following
would result under the majority's opinion.
Lender A
Interest Collected
Penalty Imposed and Amount Paid

<

NET PENALTY IMPOSED

<$ 4,500>

Interest Paid
Penalty Imposed and Amount Received
NET PENALTY REALIZED

$ 1,500
6,000 >

Lender B

<

$-0-6,000 >

<$

6,000>

Borrower X

Borrower Y

< $ 1,500>
6,000

$-06,000

$ 4,500

$ 6,000

82. See, e.g., Fuller v Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 49 (1974); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305,
308-09 (1966); Railroad Comm'n v. Miller, 434 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Tex. 1968).
83. See McKinney v. Blankenship, 154 Tex. 632, 640-41, 282 S.W.2d 691, 697 (1955);
Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 524, 8 S.W.2d 655, 656 (1928).
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State Bank, article 5069-1.06(1) can be constitutionally construed to require the refund of usurious interest paid to the borrower. "4 Such an interpretation would guarantee uniformity of both penalties for the lender and
relief for the borrower. "5
Despite the common law rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed against the state or prosecution and in favor of the accused, 8 the
majority's application of this canon appears inappropriate. 7 The recovery
of usurious interest paid is more similar to the civil remedy of conversion
than it is to a penalty. " Therefore, since article 5069-1.06 is a civil statute,"'
and recovery of usurious interest is essentially a remedy rather than a
penalty,10 a strict construction is in conflict with the general provisions for
the construction of civil statutes.' Furthermore, the majority's interpretation is inconsistent with the court's holding in Southwestern Investment
Co. v. Mannix,2 which preceded FirstState Bank by only four months. In
Mannix the Texas Supreme Court did not adopt the narrow rule of strict
construction but decided that it must follow a construction which was
reasonable and in agreement with the legislative intent.13 Additionally, the
majority in First State Bank overlooks another well-established canon of
construction that a penal statute should be construed to harmonize with
and not frustrate the policy and objectives of the legislature." The effect
84. First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 579-81 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
85. See id. at 578-81 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 577; see United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1936); United States
v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630, 632 (S.D. Tex. 1959); Mann v. Texas State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 403 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966), aff'd, 413 S.W.2d 382 (Tex.
1967).
87. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 579-80 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
88. See generally Pearce and Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A Study
of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 249 (1968).
89. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.' art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
90. See Pearce and Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A Study of the
Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 249 (1968).
91. See TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 10, §§ 6, 8 (Vernon 1971). Section 6 requires courts
to follow legislative intent in the construction of civil statutes, and section 8, in part, requires
a liberal construction of statutes to attain the statutes' objectives and to promote justice. Id.
art. 10, §§ 6, 8. See generally Comment, The JudicialAvoidance of Liberal Statutory Construction: Is Article 10, Section 8 Lost and Forgotten?, 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 163 (1978).
92. 557 S.W.2d 755, 769 (Tex. 1977) (on motion for rehearing) (court construing another
article within Consumer Credit Code); accord, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Blocker, 558 S.W.2d
493, 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); O.R. Mitchell Motors, Inc. v. Bell,
528 S.W.2d 856, 859-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
93. Southwestern +I n v. Co. v. Mannix, 557 S.W.2d 755, 769 (Tex. 1977); accord, Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Blocker, 558 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); O.R. Mitchell Motors, Inc. v. Bell, 528 S.W.2d 856, 859-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
94. Se Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974); United States v. Lacher,
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of the majority's strict construction of article 5069-1.06(1) is to allow the
lender to offset any usurious interest collected against any penalty levied.9"
It is a questionable construction that allows the lender to retain the fruits
of his wrongdoings." Finally, it is ironic that this rule, which is most often
applied in criminal proceedings,97 has been abrogated in the Penal Code"
and yet is applied without question by the majority to this civil statute."
While usury has long been subject to regulation, the common law remedy for the recovery of payments of usurious interest has not been abrogated by statutes providing penalties.'°0 Although the court held that interest paid was not recoverable under the statute, it did not preclude recovery
under a common law action.' In fact, the court implied that it might have
reached a different conclusion if the common law actions had been pled. 01
In such event the court would likely have followed the precedent, established in Bexar Building & Loan Association v. Robinson,03 that a borrower not in pari delicto could recover the interest paid in excess of the
highest legal rate.1'0
As a result of the decision in First State Bank, the imposition of penalties under article 5069-1.06(1) as construed could be questioned as producing inequitable and unconstitutional results. Although the statute is susceptible of a reasonable construction, it has been construed so narrowly
and so strictly that it frustrates the legislative intent of the usury statute.'"0
As a practical matter, the borrower when seeking to recover usurious interest payments, and to avoid the need of testing the constitutionality of the
134 U.S. 624, 629 (1890); Thompson v. Missouri K. & T. Ry., 103 Tex. 372, 378-79, 126
S.W.257, 259 (1910).
95. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tex. 1978) (Johnson, J., dissenting); cf. Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976) (obligor
required to pay usurious interest does not receive forfeiture of twice the contracted for interest).
96. See Young v. Barker, 342 P.2d 150, 159 (Kan. 1959).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1937); Prussian v. United States,
282 U.S. 675, 677 (1931); United States v. Harris, 177 U.S. 305, 310 (1900).
98. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.05(a) (Vernon 1974).
99. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978).
100. See id. at 576; Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977);
accord, Flannery v. Bishop, 504 P.2d 778, 780 (Wash. 1972).
101. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1978).
102. See id. at 577. The court referred to Ferguson v. Tanner Development Co., 541
S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561
S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977), in which a common law recovery of usurious interest was allowed.
103. 78 Tex. 163, 14 S.W. 227 (1890).
104. See id. at 168-69, 14 S.W. at 227-28.
105. Compare First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1978) with
Declarationof Legislative Intent, 15 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 1, 1-2 (Vernon 1971).
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majority's opinion, should always plead the common law action of conversion.1
Taylor S. Boone

106. See Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 168-69, 14 S.W. 227, 22728 (1890); Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
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